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Abstract—We propose a new secure transmission scheme in
this paper which uses directional modulation (DM) with artificial
noise and is aided by the intelligent reflecting surface (IRS).
Specifically, the direct path and IRS-enabled reflect path carry
the same confidential signal and thus can be coherently added at
the desired position to maximize the total received power, while
the received signals at other positions are distorted. We derive
the closed-form expression for the secrecy rate achieved by the
proposed scheme. The simulation results show that the proposed
scheme can achieve two-dimensional secure transmission at a
specific position and its performance advantage over the con-
ventional DM scheme increases when the number of reflecting
elements at the IRS increases.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, directional modu-
lation, artificial noise, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) has recently emerged
as a promising and cutting-edge technology for the fifth
generation (5G) and beyond wireless networks, which aims to
improve signal coverage and quality by controlling the low-
cost passive reflecting elements integrated on a surface [1],
[2]. Specifically, an IRS comprises a huge number of low-
cost passive reflecting elements, which can adjust the phase
shift of the incident wave and provide favourable wireless
communication channels. It is noted that 5G networks may
operate at high frequencies (e.g., 4.5 − 6 GHz). This would
incur transmission outage since signals can be easily blocked
by moving humans and static obstacles in an enclosed room.
This blockage problem can be addressed by using the IRS to
control the propagation environment, since the blocked signal
can be reflected by the IRS to the desired user. Thus, IRS
is a compelling wireless technology, particularly for indoor
applications with high density of users (e.g., stadium, shopping
mall, and exhibition center).
In wireless communication systems, physical layer security
is a fundamental solution to secrecy problems, which aims to
guarantee the confidentiality of transmitted information [3].
Among various techniques, directional modulation (DM) is
one of the effective schemes to enhancing physical layer se-
curity [4]–[6]. Specifically, DM can distort the constellation of
the signals received at potential eavesdroppers while retaining
the original shape of the signals received at the legitimate
user. As indicated in [4], [5], the signal transmission in the
DM scheme depends delicately on the line-of-sight (LoS) path,
since the unwanted artificial noise (AN) is introduced towards
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the IRS-aided DM with AN transmission.
the desired user in the multipath environment. Motivated by
this, we apply the IRS to DM with AN to reinforce the
control of the wireless propagation environment and utilize the
multipath environment to enhance the physical layer security.
In this work, we propose a novel transmission scheme to
enhance the physical layer secrecy performance of the system
where a transmitter communicates with its legitimate receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropper. The scheme uses DM with
AN and is aided by the IRS. A closed-form expression is
derived for the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme.
Using simulation results, we find that the proposed scheme can
achieve two-dimensional (2D) secure transmission. We also
find that the proposed scheme outperforms the conventional
DM scheme, specifically when more reflecting elements are
integrated at the IRS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we propose an IRS-aided DM wireless
transmission scheme. In this scheme, there are two paths from
the transmitter, Alice, to the legitimate receiver, Bob. One
is the direct Alice-Bob path and the other one is the Alice-
IRS-Bob path where the IRS reflects the incident wave from
Alice towards Bob. The IRS is equipped with a controller to
manipulate the phase of the transmit signal for a better quality
of communication. We assume that the locations of Bob and
IRS are known by Alice, denoted by (xb, yb) and (xr , yr),
respectively. We also assume that Bob and the eavesdropper,
Eve, are equipped with a single antenna.
In the Alice-Bob path, the normalized steering vector from
Alice to Bob is given by
hab =
1√
Na
[
ej2piΦ0(φab), . . . , 1, . . . , ej2piΦNa−1(φab)
]H
,
(1)
where (·)H denotes the conjugate transpose and the phase shift
Φn(φ) is defined as
Φn(φ)= − d
λ
(
n−N−1
2
)
cosφ, n=0, 1, . . . , N−1. (2)
Here, λ is wavelength of the carrier, N ∈ {Na, Nr} is the
number of antennas at Alice or reflecting elements at the IRS,
d ∈ {da, dr} is the spacing between the antennas at Alice or
the reflecting elements at the IRS, and φ ∈ {φab, φar} is the
transmit angle from Alice to Bob or from Alice to IRS.
In the Alice-IRS-Bob path, the spatial steering matrix from
Alice to IRS is given by G = g∗rg
H
t , where (·)∗ denotes the
conjugate, gt is the transmit spatial steering vector given by
gt =
1√
Na
[
ej2piΦ0(φar), . . . , 1, . . . , ej2piΦNa−1(φar)
]H
, (3)
and gr ∈ CNr×1 is the receive steering vector with all-one
elements. The IRS can be treated as a reflector with a large
number of low-cost passive elements. Thus, it can reflect the
electromagnetic waves by adding an additional phase to the
received signal. The steering vector from the IRS to Bob and
Eve are denoted by hHrb ∈ C1×Nr and hHre ∈ C1×Nr , re-
spectively, with all-one elements. The diagonal phase shifting
matrix of the IRS is given by
Θ(θ) = diag
(
e−j2piΦ0(θ−θb), · · · , e−j2piΦNr−1(θ−θb)
)
, (4)
where θ ∈ {θb, θe} is the deflection angle for the signal of
Bob or Eve at the IRS.
The signal received at Bob from both the Alice-Bob and the
Alice-IRS-Bob paths can be expressed as yb =
√
PtHbx+nb,
where nb ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at Bob, Pt is the transmit power, x = [xa xr]
T
is
the complex baseband transmitted signal at Alice, and (·)T
denotes the transpose. Moreover, Hb denotes the two paths
from Alice to Bob, given by
Hb =
[√
Labh
H
ab
√
Larbh
H
rbΘ(θb)G
]
. (5)
Due to the time difference between the two paths, we as-
sume that the confidential signal are carefully designed to
transmit at different time slots, allowing Bob to receive the
signals from two paths at the same time. Hence, we have
xa =
√
αwas +
√
1− αPaz and xr = √αwrs, where
s denotes the confidential data for Bob with the average
power E
[|s|2] = 1, wa and wr denote the precoding
vectors of the Alice-Bob path and the Alice-IRS-Bob path,
respectively, and E[·] denotes expectation. Moreover, we have
Pa ,
(
INa − habhHab
)
/‖INa − habhHab‖ as the vector to
transmit AN signals towards Eve [5], where ‖ · ‖ denotes the
Frobenius norm, z consists of Na i.i.d. circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-
variance, i.e., z ∼ CN (0, INa), and α denotes the power
allocation factor between useful signals and AN signals. We
next adopt Lxy = (dxy/d0)
−2
as the free-space path loss
model, where d0 is the reference distance and dxy is the
distance between x and y. Accordingly, Lab denotes the Alice-
Bob distance and Larb denotes the Alice-IRS-Bob distance. In
order to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob, we
set wa and wr as wa = hab and wr = gt, respectively.
The received signal at Eve is expressed as ye =
√
PtHex+
ne, where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the AWGN at Eve and He
denotes the two paths from Alice to Eve, given by
He =
[√
Laeh
H
ae
√
Lareh
H
reΘ(θe)G
]
. (6)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the
proposed scheme. By using the expressions for xa and xr and
noting that hHabwa = 1, the received signal at Bob is rewritten
as
yb =
√
PtLabh
H
ab
(√
αwas+
√
1− αPaz
)
+
√
PtLarbh
H
rbΘ(θb)G(
√
αwrs) + nb
=
(√
αPtLab +
√
αPtLarbh
H
rbΘ(θb)Gwr
)
s+ nb, (7)
where Paz is orthogonal to h
H
ab, implying h
H
abPaz = 0. As
per (3) and (4), we obtain
hHrbΘ(θb)Gwr =
1
Na
Na−1∑
k=0
Nr−1∑
l=0
ej2pi(ψ1+ψ2) = Nr, (8)
where ψ1 = Φk(φar) − Φk(φar) and ψ2 = Φl(θb) − Φl(θb).
Therefore, the SNR at Bob is given by
γb =
αPt
∣∣√Lab +√LarbNr∣∣2
σ2
. (9)
Similarly, the received signal at Eve is rewritten as
ye =
√
PtLaeh
H
ae
(√
αwas+
√
1− αPaz
)
+
√
PtLareh
H
reΘ (θe)G
(√
αwrs
)
+ ne
=
(√
αPtLaeh
H
aewa +
√
αPtLareh
H
reΘ (θe)Gwr
)
s
+
√
(1− α)PtLaehHaePaz+ ne. (10)
Accordingly, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at Eve is given by
γe =
αPt
∣∣√LaehHaewa +√LarehHreΘ (θe)Gwr∣∣2
(1 − α)Pt
∣∣√LaehHaePaz∣∣2 + σ2 , (11)
where
hHreΘ (θe)Gwr =
1
Na
Na−1∑
k=0
Nr−1∑
l=0
ej2pi(ψ1+Φl(θe)−Φl(θb))
=
ejpi
Nr
2
(cos θe−cos θb) − e−jpiNr2 (cos θe−cos θb)
ejpi
1
2
(cos θe−cos θb) − e−jpi 12 (cos θe−cos θb)
=
sin
(
Nrpi
2 (cos θe − cos θb)
)
sin
(
pi
2 (cos θe − cos θb)
) ≤ Nr. (12)
Fig. 2. The BER of our considered system versus φar and θ.
Following (12) and noting that hHaewa ≤ 1 and hHaePaz ≥ 0,
we find that γe is lower than γb.
In the considered system, the rate at Bob and Eve are given
by Rb = log2 (1 + γb) and Re = log2 (1 + γe), respectively.
Thus, as per the rules of physical layer security, the secrecy
rate of the proposed scheme is calculated as
RS = [Rb −Re]+ = log2
(
1 + γb
1 + γe
)
, (13)
where [x]+ , max{0, x}. Since we find γe < γb, RS is always
a positive value.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the secrecy
performance of the proposed scheme. Unless stated otherwise,
we consider Na = 16, Nr = 50, σ
2 = −20 dBm, Pt =
25 dBm, d0 = 1 m, α = 0.6, and the spacing between antennas
or reflecting elements is half of the wavelength. The locations
of Alice, Bob, and IRS are set as Alice (0, 0), Bob (20, 0), and
IRS (20,−15), respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the bit error rate (BER) of our considered
system versus φar and θ ranging from 0
◦ to 180◦. Here, we
consider the use of quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) such
that the BER is given by BER = Q
(√
γ
)
, where Q(·) denotes
the Q-function and γ is the SNR or SINR at a receiver. We
observe from Fig. 2 that the minimum BER is achieved by our
proposed scheme in the desired direction. We also observe that
the BER becomes worse rapidly in the undesired directions.
This is due to the fact that the signal along the desired direction
is enhanced by the Alice-IRS-Bob path but not impacted by
AN signals, whereas the signals along the undesired directions
are severely impacted by AN signals. This indicates that our
proposed scheme achieves 2D secure transmission by taking
the advantage of the additional path enabled by the IRS.
In Fig. 3, we compare the secrecy performance of our
proposed scheme, referred to as “DM, IRS”, with that of the
benchmark scheme where DM is applied without the IRS,
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Fig. 3. The secrecy rate versus Nr for different values of Pt.
referred to as “DM, No-IRS”. The security rate achieved by
the two schemes are plotted, RS versus Nr for Pt = 10 dBm
and Pt = 15 dBm. We observe that for our proposed scheme,
RS increases when Nr increases, while for the benchmark
scheme, RS remains unchanged. We then observe that the
secrecy performance advantage of our proposed scheme over
the benchmark scheme becomes more profound when Nr
increases. These observations indicate that using the IRS can
effectively enhance the security performance of a wireless
communication system with low power consumption.
V. CONCLUSION
A new IRS-aided DM with AN scheme was proposed in
this work to utilize the multipath propagation environment for
enhancing the physical layer security. In order to examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed scheme, we derived a
closed-form expression for the secrecy rate. Simulation results
showed that 2D secure transmission can be achieved by our
proposed scheme. Additionally, we found that our proposed
scheme outperforms the conventional DM scheme which does
not use IRS, and this performance advantage increases when
there are more reflecting elements at the IRS.
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